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Abstract
Should the party who loses in litigation be forced to pay the legal fees of
the winner? This paper surveys the economic literature regarding the
effects of legal fee shifting on a variety of decisions arising before and
during the litigation process. Section 2 provides a brief survey of the
practical situations in which legal fee shifting does and does not arise.
Section 3 analyzes the effects of indemnification on the incentives to
expend resources in litigated cases. Section 4 examines how
indemnification influences the decisions to bring and to defend against
suit, and Section 5 assesses its effects on the choice between settlement
and trial. Section 6 addresses the interaction between the allocation of
legal fees and the parties’ incentives for efficient primary activity
behavior. Section 7 considers two important variants on simple
indemnification: rules that shift costs based on the parties’ settlement
negotiations (such as US Federal Rule 68 and the English practice of
payment into court), and rules that shift costs based on the margin of
victory (such as US Federal Rule 11 and the common law tort of
malicious prosecution). Section 8 reviews the brief but instructive
empirical literature on legal cost shifting, and Section 9 summarizes the
discussion and offers conclusions.
JEL classification: K40, K41
Keywords: Litigation, Legal Costs, Legal Fees, Legal Fee Shifting, Offer
of Judgment Rules, Payment Into Court Rules, Rule 68
1. Introduction
In most Western legal systems, a party who prevails in litigation is
generally entitled to indemnification from the losing party for at least part
of his or her economic costs of prosecuting the lawsuit. The amount of
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litigation expenditures that can be recovered, however, varies
substantially both among and within individual regimes. In the United
States, the predominant rule awards a prevailing litigant what are
officially termed ‘costs’ – typically defined by statute to include filing
fees, court reporter charges, printing, copying, and witness fees, and the
like--but does not entitle him or her to recover expenditures on attorneys’
fees, which are usually of far greater magnitude in the case.
Consequently, US litigants can bear significant expense even when they
are ultimately vindicated on the merits. In the other common-law
countries, in contrast, and indeed in most of the rest of the Western world,
winning litigants are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees as well as other
out-of-pocket costs of litigation.
The substantial increase in expenditures on litigation and dispute
resolution in the United States over the last two decades has led both
policymakers and scholars to advocate a variety of substantive and
procedural reforms in the legal system. The rules for allocating attorneys’
fees in civil litigation have drawn particular attention in this regard, with
a number of influential commentators recommending a move in the
direction of fuller indemnification--or what in the US is usually called,
for historical reasons, the ‘English’ or ‘British’ rule. Such
recommendations have had influence on both public and private
lawmakers. In the mid 1990’s one of the more prominent and widely
supported provisions in the Republican Party’s ‘Contract with America’
platform would have adopted a modified form of the English rule for
federal cases brought under diversity jurisdiction. In the late 2000’s, as
part of the ongoing debate over health care reform, several commentators
and policymakers have proposed adopting a “loser pays” rule as a way to
curb medical malpractice costs.
But the ongoing political debate over litigation costs in the US does not
seem to have assimilated the main lesson of the economic literature on
the topic--that the effects of cost shifting on the amount and intensity of
litigation are substantially more complicated than a superficial
consideration of the matter might suggest. Indeed, the current state of
economic knowledge does not enable us reliably to predict whether a
move to fuller indemnification would raise or lower the total costs of
litigation, let alone whether it would better align those costs with any
social benefits they might generate.
The reason for this agnosticism is straightforward. In short, fee shifting is
too coarse a tool for the multifaceted problem that it is meant to solve.
The problem that fee shifting is meant to solve is, in essence, the
existence of externalities in the litigation decision making. Most
supporters of fee shifting focus on a single negative externality: the costs
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that plaintiffs impose on both defendants and the public at large in
deciding to bring suit. But the allocation of legal costs influences a long
list of decision points along the litigation flow, including the decision of
how much effort to expend in preparing for and participating in trial, the
choice between settlement and trial, the decision to initiate a lawsuit, and
the choice to modify one’s out of court behavior so as to avoid suit in the
first place. At each of these decision points an individual litigant’s
incentives do not generally conform to the interests of society as a whole.
And such divergences of private and social interest vary both in
magnitude and direction.
For example, the plaintiff’s private decision to bring suit is itself the locus
of several opposing externalities. A plaintiff’s decision to sue imposes an
obvious cost on the defendant and on taxpayers, who foot the bill for
public legal institutions. Less obviously, the suit affects litigants in other
filed cases by crowding the courts and delaying the resolution of other
disputes in the system. The suit also affects these and future litigants by
altering the state of legal precedent. Lastly, the suit affects the public at
large—both potential violators and their potential victims—by
influencing the perceived likelihood of sanctions for violating substantive
legal duties.
The decision to pursue a lawsuit to trial rather than settling, as well as the
decision to litigate more rather than less intensively, generate analogous
external costs and benefits.
Litigation does not, therefore, present a single externality that might be
corrected with a single policy pool. It presents a complex bundle of
positive and negative externalities whose correction requires an array of
policy instruments.
Shifting legal fees may indeed repair some
externalities. But it will fail to address others. And some it may well
exacerbate.
This paper surveys the effects of legal fee shifting on a variety of
decisions arising before and during the litigation process. Section 2
provides a brief survey of the practical situations in which legal fee
shifting does and does not arise. Section 3 analyzes the effects of
indemnification on the incentives to expend resources in litigated cases.
Section 4 examines how indemnification influences the decisions to bring
and to defend against suit, and Section 5 assesses its effects on the choice
between settlement and trial. Section 6 addresses the interaction between
the allocation of legal fees and the parties’ incentives for efficient primary
behavior. Section 7 considers two important variants on simple
indemnification: rules that shift costs based on the parties’ settlement
negotiations (such as US Federal Rule 68 and the English practice of
payment into court), and rules that shift costs based on the margin of
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victory (such as US Federal Rule 11 and the common-law tort of
malicious prosecution). Section 8 reviews the empirical literature on legal
cost shifting.
Section 9 summarizes the discussion and offers
conclusions.
(N.B.: The scholarly literature on fee shifting is vast and it is not possible
to discuss every pertinent contribution. This paper describes the seminal
papers on the topic as well as a sizable and representative sample of
additional contributions.)
2. The Practical Extent of Legal Fee Shifting
This paper does not attempt to survey the law governing fee shifting,
either in the US or elsewhere. For a continually updated account of US
state and federal law, see Martin (2005, 2008). It should be recognized,
however, that there are significant areas of US legal practice that do not
follow the traditional American rule. Most important among these are the
various federal and state statutes that entitle a successful plaintiff, though
not a successful defendant, to court-awarded attorneys’ fees as part of a
recovery. Similar ‘one-way’ fee-shifting policies have also been
established in both federal and state courts through a combination of
statutory interpretation and common law development, though the scope
for such interpretations at the federal level was substantially limited by
the Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.
Such provisions and policies, which make up a central part of litigation
practice in such fields as civil rights, consumer, and antitrust law, have
only some of the effects of the traditional two-way English rule. Second,
both federal and state courts have authority to award indemnification to
parties who are victimized by abuse of process, though such authority is
typically exercised only in response to egregious behavior. Examples
include the provisions in Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 11 dealing with frivolous or
improper pleadings, and those in Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 37 relating to
discovery abuse. US practice also provides litigants with an ‘offer-ofjudgment’ procedure under which a defendant can make a settlement
offer to the plaintiff which, if rejected and filed with the court, creates a
trigger for partial indemnification. Both of these specialized types of
provisions - sanctions for abuse and offers of judgment - are discussed
separately in Section 7 below.
Conversely, even in jurisdictions following the majority or ‘English’ rule,
indemnification for legal costs is substantially less than complete. Courtawarded attorneys’ fees obviously do not compensate for the
nonmonetary and psychic costs of litigation. Even the monetary amounts
awarded, furthermore, are limited by the judge’s view of what
expenditures are reasonable and, in some jurisdictions (for example,
British Columbia), by statutory schedule. Such judicial and statutory caps
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can and often do hold fee awards below the going market rate for legal
representation, forcing winning litigants to pay the difference out of
anticipated recoveries or their own pockets (indeed, Leubsdorf, 1984,
presents evidence that such court-imposed price ceilings were responsible
for the historical development of the American rule in the first place).
Accordingly, the pure English and American rules discussed below
should be understood as ideal polar cases, and the differences among
actual jurisdictional practices as ones of degree along a spectrum ranging
from lesser to greater indemnification .
Additionally, Donohue (1991b) points out that the American rule is a
default rule rather than a mandatory one, in that parties are generally free
to provide for indemnification through private contract - either at the time
they begin their litigation or, for those disputes arising out of a consensual
relationship, in their original agreement. He presents anecdotal evidence
that such ex ante indemnification terms are widespread, though the
provisions he cites seem primarily to be drawn from standardized form
contracts and tend to operate asymmetrically in favor of the drafting
party: for instance, apartment leases that indemnify landlords but not
tenants for attorneys’ fees in the event of a dispute over unpaid rent. The
scope for fee shifting in the US, therefore, may be significantly greater
than is ordinarily supposed. Conversely, there is no apparent bar in
England or in the other jurisdictions following the English rule to a partial
settlement or stipulation in which the litigants agree in advance to give up
their rights to indemnification ex post.
Somewhat more problematic, however, are Donohue’s further conjectures
that such contractual terms are likely to be efficiency-enhancing and that
the pattern of such terms will help reveal whether the English or
American rule is more efficient. To the extent that indemnification is
provided by a one-sided standardized term, there is no guarantee that it
promotes the joint interests of the parties. The nondrafting party may fail
to notice the indemnification provision at all; and if he does notice it, he
may avoid raising it as an issue for fear of revealing himself as someone
who anticipates a dispute. Even when such agreements arise out of armslength bargaining, furthermore, this does not imply that they are efficient.
As Bernstein (1993) and Shavell (1995) have observed in their respective
analyses of alternative dispute resolution, because of the divergence of
private and social incentives in litigation, the fact that a particular
agreement is in the litigants’ ex post interest does not necessarily mean
that it is socially efficient. The fact that the parties have come to litigation
in the first place, moreover, casts doubt on the presumption that they are
bargaining in a Coasian fashion.
3. The Effect of Fee Shifting on Trial and Pretrial Expenditures
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The standard economic theory of litigation, as developed by Landes
(1971), Posner (1973), and Gould (1973), models litigating parties as
rational actors who seek to maximize their returns from the litigation
process. From this perspective, amounts spent on trial preparation can be
seen as a type of private investment. An additional hour of legal research
or argumentation is profitable, in this view, only if the marginal return,
measured by the change in the expected outcome of trial or settlement,
outweighs the cost of the attorney’s time. Plaintiffs, accordingly, will
choose to spend legal resources up to the point where their expected
recoveries, net of expenses, are maximized; defendants will act so as to
minimize total payouts. The precise outcome of this contest depends on
how the parties react and adjust to each others’ decisions. One simple and
natural assumption is that the litigants reach a Nash equilibrium in
expenditure; that is, that each takes the other’s expenditure as given when
choosing his own. Whatever the nature of the parties’ strategic
interaction, however, the parties’ expenditures are determined in
equilibrium by a host of economic and technological factors including the
stakes of the case, the marginal cost of legal resources, and the sensitivity
of trial outcomes to the parties’ individual efforts. In high-stakes cases in
which the outcome is heavily dependent on the parties’ work product,
expenditures will be high; in petty cases where the outcome is largely
predetermined by legal precedent, expenditures will be low.
As Braeutigam, Owen, and Panzar (1984) first proved, and Katz (1987)
subsequently explained, it follows from the standard model that fee
shifting encourages greater expenditure in litigated cases. The reasons are
twofold.
First, fee shifting increases the stakes of the case by making legal
expenditures part of the potential damages. Second, fee shifting lowers
the expected marginal cost of legal expenditure: each party, when
deciding whether to purchase an additional unit of legal services, will
discount its cost by the probability with which she expects to win and to
be reimbursed by her opponent.
More formally: if we let p denote the probability of liability, A the
amount awarded if the plaintiff wins, and x and y the amounts spent by
the plaintiff and defendant respectively, then under the American rule a
plaintiff will expect to recover p(x, y) A(x, y) –x. Assuming risk-neutrality
for the sake of simplicity, it follows she will choose x to satisfy the firstorder condition, pxA + pAx = 1. The defendant, conversely, expects to pay
out pA + y, and will select y to satisfy his first-order-condition, py A + pAy
= -1.
Under the English rule, in contrast, the plaintiff’s expected recovery is pA
- (1 - p)(x + y); so her first-order-condition is px(A + x + y) + pAx = 1 - p.
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Similarly, the defendant’s expected payout is p(A + x + y), and his firstorder-condition is py(A + x + y) + pAy = -p.
In all of these equations, the left-hand side represents the marginal private
benefit of expenditure, and the right-hand side its marginal cost.
Inspection of the equations reveals that the marginal private cost of legal
expenditure is lower for both parties under the English rule. If the parties’
expenditure affects the probability of liability (that is, if px and py are
positive), the marginal private benefit is also higher; if expenditure affects
only the amount awarded, and not also the probability of liability,
marginal benefit is unchanged. Other things being equal, therefore, the
English rule makes expenditure more attractive.
It should be noted that the marginal-cost effect depends not on the actual
probability of liability, but on its perceived probability. It follows that the
increase in expenditure under the English rule will be greater the more
optimistic are the litigants. In the extreme, parties who regard themselves
as very likely to win will perceive litigation as virtually costless and will
increase their expenditures accordingly. To the extent that such efforts
increase the probability of prevailing, therefore, such optimism will be
partially self-fulfilling.
Similarly, in other than even cases, the marginal-cost effect will be
stronger for the party with the stronger probability of prevailing ex ante.
For instance, if both parties regard the initial probability of liability as 90
percent, the plaintiff will discount the expected marginal cost of legal
services to 10¢ on the dollar while the defendant discounts it only to 90¢.
Accordingly, if the English rule is adopted, the stimulus to the plaintiff’s
expenditure will be ten times greater than the stimulus to the defendant’s.
Thus, fee shifting reinforces the advantages of the party who is initially
favored in litigation.
Because of the interaction between the parties’ expenditure decisions, it is
not possible to prove that both sides will increase their expenditures under
the English rule. The reason for this ambiguity is that a marginal increase
in one side’s expenditure has an ambiguous effect on the other side’s
expenditures. A marginal increase in the spending by one side could
either provoke the opponent to respond in kind, or intimidate him into
reducing his own efforts.
Braeutigam, Owen, and Panzar, however, showed that in Nash
equilibrium the sum of the parties’ expenditures must increase. The extent
of the increase depends on how sensitive p and A are to litigation
expenditure, as Plott (1987) has demonstrated. Using a Nash equilibrium
model and making some simplifying technical assumptions regarding
functional form, Plott found that if the case outcome depends entirely on
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factors out of the litigants’ control, the English rule has no effect on
expenditure. If case outcome is determined solely by litigants’ efforts,
conversely, the English rule will cause expenditure to increase without
limit.
Such effects are mitigated in regimes that limit the amount of fees that
can be shifted. For example, under both English and US practice,
indemnification is limited to reasonable expenditures. Hyde and
Williams (2002) study partial fee shifting, allowing for uncertainty
regarding the quantity of costs that will be deemed shiftable by the court.
Similarly, some recent US proposals provide that a losing party need not
pay any indemnification in excess of his or her own litigation costs.
Hughes and Woglom (1996) show that the English rule operates as a tax
on the weaker party’s expenditure, since increases in the weaker party’s
spending raise the cap on the indemnification potentially payable to the
stronger party.
Furthermore, while most of the economic literature on litigation
expenditure has assumed a Nash equilibrium, a few authors (for example,
Hersch, 1990) have argued that it is not reasonable to expect litigants to
ignore the effect on the other side’s expenditure when choosing their
own. The Nash specification is most appealing when expenditure is
simultaneous, when each side must choose how much to spend before
learning the opponent’s decision, or when the expenditure decision is
largely determined by one’s initial choice of an attorney; it is least
appealing when one side can commit to a given level of expenditure and
communicate that commitment to the opponent in advance. One can
analyze the latter situation using the model of conjectural variations--socalled because it allows a party’s decision to depend upon his conjectures
regarding how the opponent’s decision varies with his own. Formally, let
vx denote the rate at which the plaintiff expects the defendant to respond
to her expenditures. This rate could be positive (in which case
expenditure would be provocative), negative (in which case expenditure
would be intimidating), or zero (as in the Nash model). The plaintiff’s
first-order condition then becomes (px + vx py)A + p (A x+ vx A y) = 1 under
the American rule, and (px + vx py)(A + x + y) + p (A x+ vx A y) = (1 - p)(1
+ vx) under the English rule. (The analysis for the defendant is symmetric
and is omitted for the sake of brevity.) Comparing the first term of each
of the equations, one can see that the stakes effect is still present. The
direction of the marginal-cost effect, however, is now ambiguous. Under
the English rule, if the plaintiff spends an additional dollar on legal
services it will cost her only 1 - p, after she discounts for the probability
of prevailing. But if the plaintiff loses, she will also have to pay the
defendant’s costs, and the additional dollar of plaintiff spending induces
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the defendant to change his expenditures by vx. If the plaintiff’s
expenditure is intimidating, this will lower her marginal cost even further.
If her expenditure is sufficiently provocative, however, her marginal cost
of legal resources will rise; if it is provocative enough to outweigh the
stakes effect, her equilibrium expenditure will fall.
Lastly, most models of fee shifting and litigation expenditure assume that
lawyer and client act as one. When this is not the case—when there are
agency problems in the lawyer-client relationship—the effects of fee
shifting on litigation spending become potentially subject to the nature of
the contract for attorney services. Hyde (2006) studies the interaction
between the fee allocation rule and two such contracts: contingent fee
arrangements—wherein the victorious lawyer receives a percentage of the
litigation award—and conditional fee arrangements—wherein a
victorious lawyer is paid a multiple of the market value of her services.
The analysis in this section has focused on the amount of resources
expended in litigated cases. Total expenditures on litigation, however, are
the product of two factors: expenditures per litigated case, and the
number of cases that are actually litigated. Fee shifting can influence the
number of litigated cases in two ways: by influencing the decision to
bring the dispute to court in the first place, and by influencing the parties’
incentive to settle cases before trial. The next section of this article
discusses the former effect, and Section 5 discusses the latter.
4. Effects of Fee Shifting on the Decisions to File and Contest
Lawsuits
Consider the case of a consumer who has purchased a defective ballpoint
pen and who is in theory entitled to a refund. Because the value of the pen
is exceeded by even the most streamlined judicial proceeding, the
consumer’s threat to litigate is not credible; and absent procedural devices
such as a class action that can allow aggregation of her claim with others,
she will be forced to rely on nonlegal incentives such as the seller’s
interest in its reputation. If the consumer can recover legal fees along with
the value of her refund, however, her threat to sue becomes credible.
4.1 Basic Model
Shavell (1982a), extending the work of Landes (1971) and Gould (1973)
on the incentives to sue, generalized this argument to show that the
English rule, and indemnification in general, works to encourage lawsuits
by plaintiffs with relatively small claims but relatively high ex ante
probabilities of victory. The American rule, conversely, encourages
plaintiffs with relatively large claims but lower probabilities of victory.

Fee Shifting in Litigation

10

The formal logic of the argument is as follows: let p represent the
probability of a plaintiff victory, A the expected award if the plaintiff
wins, and c the cost of litigation for each litigant. (To simplify the
argument, suppose that this cost is the same for both sides; this will affect
the specific point at which the incentives switch, but not the basic
intuition of the argument.) Under the American rule, litigation is
profitable if (and only if) pA > c; thus, a plaintiff will bring suit if she
views her chances as better than the threshold probability p US c/A. Under
the English rule, however, the plaintiff’s expected litigation cost is not c
but (1 - p)2c, since she pays no costs if she wins but 2c if she loses. She
will accordingly wish to litigate if pA > (1 - p)2c, or equivalently, if she
views her chances at better than pENG2c/(A + 2c). Algebraic manipulation
reveals that c > A/2 implies p US > pENG > !, and c<A/2 implies pUS < pENG
< !. Thus, when costs are high or stakes low, the English rule encourages
some better-than-average suits that would be deterred under the American
rule; when costs are low or stakes high, the English rule discourages some
worse-than-average suits that would be brought under the American rule.
An identical line of argument shows the effect of indemnification on the
incentives to defend against a lawsuit once it has been brought. If it costs
the defendant c to put up a defense that will succeed with probability p, it
is worthwhile to defend (rather than suffer a default) only if the expected
savings pA exceed the expected costs of litigation. Under the American
rule these expected costs are c, and under the English rule they are (1 p)2c. The logic is as before; the American rule encourages long-shot
defenses in high-stakes and low-cost cases, while the English rule
encourages high-probability defenses in high-cost and low-stakes cases.
Such arguments lend support to the frequently expressed view that the
English rule is superior on grounds of corrective justice, since the claims
and defenses that it promotes are relatively meritorious ones - at least
when viewed from an ex ante perspective. Similarly, as Rosenberg and
Shavell (1985) and Farmer and Pecorino (1998) argue, indemnification
can help discourage certain frivolous or ‘strike’ suits. Rosenberg and
Shavell argue that indemnification emboldens defendants to put forward
costly defenses against strike suits (assuming that the frivolous nature of
the suit is common knowledge; as Katz (1990) argues, the English rule
may do little to discourage strike suits that cannot be identified as such
without a trial). Farmer and Pecorino argue that indemnification reduces
the frequency of strike suits by dampening the incentive of plaintiffs’
attorneys to develop a reputation for carrying out the threat of pursuing
frivolous litigation.
But there is a cost to this ostensible increase in justice. The claim and
defenses encouraged by the English rule are low-stakes and high-cost -
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that is, expensive to try relative to their importance. The claims and
defenses encouraged by the American rule may be relative longshots on
the merits, but they are relatively cheap to resolve. Moreover, some suits,
including those brought to test or clarify the law or to settle matters of
principle, may be socially desirable notwithstanding a low ex ante
probability of success. Accordingly, legal policy in this area may present
a tradeoff between justice and more narrow conceptions of efficiency.
Any conclusions regarding the effect of litigation fee shifting on
incentives to sue must also take account of the litigants’ expected
response to risk. As has been widely recognized, the English rule
magnifies the private risk arising from litigation by increasing both the
returns from success and the losses from defeat. Thus, it tends to
discourage risk-averse parties from bringing or defending lawsuits,
regardless of the merits of their positions - a factor that has been stressed
by partisans of the American rule. What has been less well recognized,
however, is that this same increase in variance can encourage more
litigation by the risk-neutral. The reason is that most lawsuits are divided
into a series of procedural stages, at each of which it is possible to decide
whether to continue depending on how the case is going. Because of this
flexibility, as Cornell (1990) has shown, the decision to litigate can be
interpreted as the purchase of an option. Just as financial options can sell
for a positive price even if the probability of exercising them is low, the
option value of litigation can make it profitable to put forward claims
with negative expected value. Because the value of an option increases
with its variance, the English rule, by increasing both the upside and the
downside of litigation, intensifies this incentive. Indeed, if parties can
drop arguments before trial without penalty, such enhanced option value
could increase litigation even by the risk-averse.
5.2 Multi-phase Models
Additionally, as the previous section indicated, the English rule indirectly
alters incentives to sue through its effects on the expected cost of the
individual case. Because indemnification encourages parties to litigate
their disputes more intensively, it increases the expected cost of bringing
and defending suits ex ante. This increase in the ex ante expected cost of
bringing suit will, in turn, affect parties’ decisions regarding whether to
pursue their cases—that is, whether to file suit, in the case of a plaintiff,
or refrain from defaulting in the case of a defendant. Adding litigation
intensity to the model may thereby affect conventional conclusions
regarding the effect of fee allocation rules on the composition of cases
that are jointly pursued.
A number of recent papers on fee shifting have combined litigation
intensity, filing decisions, and default decisions in a single model. In
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Farmer and Pecorino (1999), the plaintiff first decides whether to file suit.
If the plaintiff does file suit, the defendant next decides whether to simply
pay the default judgment. If the defendant decides not to default, the two
parties engage in the kind of litigation expenditure game described in
Section 3. Farmer and Pecorino ask which rule, English or American,
imposes lower litigation costs, and which results in more accurate
dispositions. They emphasize that the answer depends on the shape of the
exogenous litigation expenditure technology that is assumed to be in
place—that is, on the shape of p(x, y) and A(x, y), as defined above in
Section 3. They show that for each fee allocation rule, there exist
technology parameter values under which plaintiffs file only meritorious
claims, defendants always pay the default judgment, and litigation costs
are zero.
Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (2005) also combine filing, default, and
litigation expenditure decisions, though in a different manner. In their
two phase model, the parties first simultaneously decide whether to
concede. If neither party concedes, the parties next simultaneously
decide how much to spend on litigation. Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries
assume that the party with the highest quality case wins the case with
probability one. Furthermore, the quality of each party’s case is, in turn,
a strictly increasing function of her litigation expenditure. Thus, the party
spending the most wins the case with probability one. In this context—
which resembles a first price auction as much as it does litigation—Baye,
Kovenock, and de Vries study a wide variety of fee shifting rules. With
regard to the comparison of American and English rules, they obtain
more definitive results than do Farmer and Pecorino. This is not,
however, inconsistent with Farmer and Pecorino’s general point that the
effect of fee shifting is sensitive to assumptions made about the
exogenous litigation technology.
The definitiveness of Baye’s,
Kovenock’s, and de Vries’s results appears to be due in large measure to
their having restricted attention to a specific litigation technology.
5. Effects of Fee Shifting on the Settlement of Litigation
Because the great majority of civil cases are settled rather than tried, and
because trial substantially increases the cost of disputes, effects on
settlement are a critical factor in any comparison of the English and
American rules. As a result, the economic literature on fee shifting has
focused on this issue more than any other. The conventional wisdom
among practicing attorneys appears to be that a shift toward fuller
indemnification would encourage settlement. The conclusions of the
scholarly literature, however, cannot be said to offer strong support for
this proposition; at best the effects are ambiguous.
5.1 Relative Optimism Models
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As a first approximation, fee shifting magnifies the effect of litigants’
optimism, making them less likely to settle. As Landes (1971) and Gould
(1973) observed, since litigation is a negative-sum game ex post, parties
who accurately assess their chances of victory have a strong collective
incentive to avoid the costs of trial. Indeed, in a world of purely Coasian
bargaining, there would be no trials at all, since full sharing of
information would eliminate any differences of opinion. Because of
random variations in information, judgment, and temperament, however,
some fraction of litigants will inevitably overassess their chances; and it
is these optimistic litigants who have an incentive to go to trial.
Pessimistic or unbiased parties, in contrast, would prefer to settle. But the
degree of optimism necessary for a trial to result depends on how
litigation costs are allocated, as the following argument (suggested by
Mause, 1969, and formally demonstrated by Shavell, 1982a) shows:
Under the American rule, a plaintiff who perceives the probability of
liability as pP, her stakes as AP, and her costs as cP will insist on receiving
a settlement of no less than S P = p P AP - cP. Similarly, a defendant who
perceives the probability of liability as pD, his stakes as AD, and his costs
as cD will be willing to pay no more than SD = pD AD + cD. (Notice for
future reference that the parties’ stakes, and not just the probability
assesstments, may differ in this formulation.) Settlement is thus possible
if (and only if) SP < S D, or equivalently, if the total litigation costs, cP +
cD, exceed the difference between the parties’ reservation settlement
values, pP AP - pD AD. Parties whose litigation costs are below this cutoff
level, conversely, will prefer to go to trial.
Under the English rule, however, the plaintiff’s reservation settlement
value becomes SP = p P AP - (1 - p P)(cP + cD), and the defendant’s becomes
SD = pD (AD + cP + cD). Now settlement is possible only if cP + cD > (pP
AP - p D AD)/(1 - pP + pD). If the plaintiff’s probability estimate that she
will win, p P, exceeds the defendant’s probability estimate that the plaintiff
will win, p D--that is, if the parties are optimistic relative to each other—
the aggregate litigation cost minimum for settlement under the English
rule is equal to that under the American rule divided by a number that is
less than one. The aggregate litigation cost minimum under the English
rule is thus greater than the aggregate litigation cost minimum under the
English rule. Settlements are thus less likely under the English rule.
Another way to see this is as follows: From the two expressions for the
plaintiff’s minimal acceptable settlement amount S P, it is clear that
changing to the English rule from the American rule causes SP to
increase by -(1 - pP)(cP + cD) – (-cP) = pP (cP + cD) - cD. This change in
SP is easily interpreted by triangulating with a hypothetical baseline in
which the plaintiff pays both parties’ costs. Relative to this plaintiff-
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pays-all rule, the English rule pays the plaintiff back aggregate costs in
the event that that the plaintiff wins, a payment with expected value pP (c P
+ cD) Relative to the plaintiff-pays-all rule, the American rule always
pays her back the defendant’s costs, cD. Thus, switching from the
American rule to the English rule increases the plaintiffs expected costs
by pP (cP + cD) - cD, as claimed.
We can conduct the same analysis for the defendant. From the above
equations, we see that changing from the American rule to the Engish rule
causes the defendant’s maximum acceptable settlement amount SD to
increase by pD(cP + cD) – cD. Thus, triangulating with respect to a
hypothetical baseline in which the defendant pays neither parties’ costs,
the English rule makes the defendant pay both parties’ costs in the event
that the plaintiff wins, while the American rule always makes him pay his
own costs.
Now, if pP = pD, fee shifting causes the plaintiff’s minimal acceptable
settlement amount and the defendant’s maximum acceptable settlement
amount to increase by the same amount, and there is no change in the
minimum aggregate litigation cost cP + cD for settlement. But if p P > pD ,
then fee shifting causes the plaintiff’s minimal acceptable settlement
amount to increase by more than the defendant’s maximum acceptable
settlement amount, and the minimum aggregate litigation cost for
settlement increases.
The economic intuition underlying this result is that indemnification
internalizes one externality while creating another. Under the English
rule, a litigant is forced to take into account the other side’s litigation
costs to the extent that she risks losing the case, making her more willing
to settle. But conversely, she is freed of her own litigation costs to the
extent that she hopes to win, making her less likely to settle. Since
litigants are disproportionately drawn from the population of optimists
(else they would settle however costs are allocated), the latter effect tends
to outweigh the former. Indeed, in the limiting case when both parties are
fully confident of winning, neither expects to pay any costs at all and
settlement is impossible.
This line of argument, however, suggests an important exception to the
basic result: in some cases, parties might choose to litigate due to a
difference of opinion not over liability but over stakes. A plaintiff who
regarded the stakes as sufficiently higher than did the defendant - for
example, because she hoped to establish a favorable precedent that could
be drawn on in later cases - might refuse all settlements even if the parties
agreed on the probability of liability or were both relatively pessimistic. If
the parties’ relative optimism about the stakes were enough to outweigh
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their relative pessimism about probability, fee shifting would encourage
settlement and discourage trial.
5.2 Structured Bargaining with Assymetric Information
The Landes-Gould model of settlement bargaining (often called the
‘optimism model’ in subsequent literature) is open to the criticism that it
assumes that each party knows the other’s reservation value in settlement
negotiations, whereas such values are more naturally assumed to be
private information.
Accordingly, subsequent writers have often
preferred to base their analyses on models of assymmterric information
bargaining. In this formulation, as first proposed by Cooter, Marks and
Mnookin (1982), trials are caused not by optimism but by uncertainty
over the opponent’s reservation settlement value.
In most formal models of asymmetric information settlement bargaining
(see, for example, Bebchuk, 1984), one party has private information
regarding the outcome of the case, and the other makes a single take-it-orleave-it settlement offer. (In Reinganum and Wilde, 1986, however, the
offeror also has private information.) Thus, the offeror does not know
whether her single offer will be accepted, and if it is not, she must pay the
cost of trial. This generates a familiar tradeoff: a more generous
settlement offer is more likely to be accepted, which is good, but, on the
other hand, the acceptance itself is not as favorable to the offeror. The
trade off is similar to that faced by the classic monopolist: lowering price
increases purchases, but every purchase generates less revenue.
Whether cases settle in such a model depends on a number of factors,
including the stakes in the case, the cost of litigation, and, most
importantly, the extent of the offeror’s uncertainty regarding the
reservation value of her opponent. Roughly speaking, greater dispersion
in the probability distribution of the offeree’s reservation settlement
values means a lower density at any given value, so that a decision by the
offeror decision to take a marginally tougher position sacrifices fewer
bargains. This increases the net marginal benefit of making a less
generous settlement offer. If the effect is sufficiently uniform across the
continnum of possible settlement offers, more uncertainty will mean less
settlement.
Asymmetric information models of settlement bargaining tend to confirm
the optimism model’s conclusion that the English rule generally
discourages settlement in disputes revolving around liability, but not in
disputes revolving around stakes. The reason is that indemnification
magnifies uncertainty in the former set of cases but not in the latter. More
precisely, uncertainty about opponents’ reservation values can stem from
numerous sources: variations in the private cost and stakes of litigation,
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variation in attitudes toward risk and delay, and variation in private
information relevant to the trial outcome. Differences in risk aversion,
time preference and litigation stakes are not affected by fee shifting, but
differences in private cost and in information relevant to liability are. Fee
shifting thus increases the difference between the reservation values of
parties with favorable private information and high litigation costs on the
one hand, and parties with unfavorable information and low litigation
costs on the other. This increase in uncertainty leads all types of parties to
toughen their overall bargaining stance, thus lowering the probability of
settlement. Ironically, as Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1997) point out, this
implies that the English rule actually lowers the average quality of tried
cases, since the marginal parties it sends to trial have relatively less
favorable private information than those who would litigate absent the
prospect of indemnification.
Even if fee shifting does not alter the probability of settlement, however,
it can still influence its amount. As Cooter and Rubinfeld (1994) have
argued in the context of legal discovery and Bebchuk and Chang (1996)
have argued in the context of offers of judgment, fee shifting can, by
equalizing the bargaining power of parties with asymmetric litigation
costs, help to move the settlement amount closer to the expected trial
outcome. To the extent that trial outcomes are deemed to be just, fee
shifting thus may help promote equity; to the extent that trial outcomes
reflect substantive legal norms, fee shifting helps promote incentives for
proper primary behavior - a subject more fully explored in the following
section.
In most asymmetric information models the subject of private information
is the outcome of the case. But parties may also have private information
regarding other variables, such as their own trial costs. Chopard, Cortade,
and Langlais (2008) study this possibility (for the case of both one- and
two-sided asymmetric information). They emphasize that changing the
subject of private information markedly changes the preductions of the
model.
5.3 Multi-phase Models
The foregoing discussion of both optimism and asymmetric information
models of settlement bargaining has taken the cost of litigation as given.
As previous sections have observed, however, indemnification generally
raises litigation costs—through its effect on litigation intensity.
Recent research imbeds a model of settlement negotiation within a large
multi-phase model of litigation that includes litigation intensity decisions.
Doing so greatly complicates the analysis. Tractability is typically
restored by adopting helpful function form assumptions.
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Gong and Mcafee (2000) combine a model of two-sided asymmetricinformation settlement negotiation with a model of litigation expenditure
that is similar to that described in Section 3. In particular, for their
litigation expenditure phase, Gong and Mcafee adopt a simplified
litigation technology in which the chance of plaintiff victory equals the
plaintiff’s proportional contribution to total evidence.
Gong and
Mcafee’s chief concern is the accuracy of the settlement amount. They
find that the English rule shifts the settlement amount away from the best
estimate of the proper settlement amount—where such estimate is based
on aggregating the information that is privately received by each of the
parties.
Chen and Wang (2007) also analyze a multi-stage model that includes
both settlement negotiation and litigation spending. Chen and Wang’s
model differs from Gong and Mcafee’s in several important respects.
First, Chen and Wang include the plainntiff’s filing decision. Second, the
settlement negotiation phase in Chen and Wang’s model is the usual onesided asymmetric model in which the uninformed party makes a take-itor-leave-it-offer. Lastly, the plaintiff’s lawyer, who is paid on a
contingency fee basis, makes all litigation decisions for the plaintiff’s
side. With the additional of several functional form assumptions—Chen
and Wang find that the English rule results in fewer filed suits, higher
settlement rates under certain distributional assumptions, greater trial
costs, and a greater chance of defendant victory.
6. Effects of Fee Shifting on Substantive Behavior
The discussion thus far is in a fundamental sense incomplete, since it has
focused largely on the procedural costs of litigation. If such costs were
one’s only concern, of course, they could be eliminated entirely by
abolishing the legal system and all publicly enforceable rights to relief. A
central purpose of having a public system of courts, however, is to redress
wrongs and to encourage compliance with primary substantive norms
such as taking precautions against accidents and keeping one’s promises.
Indemnity of legal fees, accordingly, must ultimately be judged on these
latter criteria - or more accurately, on whether it increases the social value
of substantive enforcement net of process costs.
Viewed from this perspective, the English rule initially appears attractive,
since it tends to encourage high probability suits and discourage low
probability ones. Assuming that the probability of liability is correlated
with the actual violation of substantive norms, therefore, indemnification
increases the net expected punishment for such violations and thus helps
promote substantive compliance. This is easily seen in the case where
courts’ liability determinations are error-free, as Rose-Ackerman and
Geistfeld (1987) and Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1988) have shown.
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Consider a potential tortfeasor who can take precautions against an
accident that will cause an uncertain amount of damage. Suppose that the
possible damage ranges from zero to A, and that the cost of establishing
liability following an accident is c. Under the American rule, it follows
that the tortfeasor will have inadequate incentives for precaution. In the
event that damages turn out to be less than c, the victim will not sue, so
the tortfeasor will escape responsibility for a portion of the damages
caused. Under the English rule, however, the victim will always have the
incentive to sue, so that all accident costs will be fully internalized. Under
a rule of negligence as opposed to strict liability, indeed, complete cost
internalization can be achieved without incurring any litigation costs at
all: defendants will be induced to take optimal care by the threat of
litigation, so plaintiffs will never actually have to sue. Conversely, under
the American rule, defendants may rationally decide to take excess care or to abstain from risky though optimal activities - in order to avoid the
greater expense of having to defend their behavior in court.
Indemnification protects them from such expenses, thus preventing
overdeterrence.
This happy outcome, however, depends on the assumption that deserving
plaintiffs and defendants always win their cases. In the presence of legal
error, as P’ng (1987) and Polinsky and Shavell (1989) have shown,
neither the American nor the English rule provides incentives that are
first-best optimal. Optimal incentives, rather, require at least two separate
policy instruments - one to motivate efficient substantive behavior, and
another to promote an efficient amount of litigation. Polinsky and Che
(1991) demonstrate that, in general, this means decoupling the amounts
paid by losing defendants from those received by victorious plaintiffs.
(Indeed, as Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1996) show, decoupling is generally
necessary even to achieve the lesser goal of minimizing the litigation
costs associated with achieving a given level of deterrence.) Devices
combining fines, punitive damages, and taxes (positive or negative) on
litigation accomplish such decoupling, but the English rule, which merely
re-allocates costs between the parties in zero-sum fashion, does not.
Furthermore, it is not even the case that the English rule is second-best
efficient within the category of zero-sum policy instruments. Kaplow
(1993) shows that damage multipliers, such as the treble damage
provisions of US antitrust law, provide a cheaper method of achieving
any given amount of deterrence. The reason is that damage multipliers
provide incentives for private law enforcement to be undertaken by those
plaintiffs whose litigation costs are lowest; fee shifting, in contrast,
encourages plaintiffs to bring lawsuits without regard to their costs of
litigation.
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One might still ask whether the English rule does better than the
American in promoting efficient substantive behavior, notwithstanding
the potential availability of alternatives that are superior to both. The
answer to this question, however, is ambiguous, as Gravelle (1993),
Hylton (1993a, 1993b), and Beckner and Katz (1995) demonstrate in
independent formal models. It is possible to draw generalizations
regarding when the English rule improves matters, but they depend on the
subtle interaction of a number of factors, including whether substantive
precaution affects the magnitude of injury or just its probability, the
extent to which precaution affects the probability of liability, whether
damage awards are sufficient to compensate plaintiffs for their losses, and
whether defendants have the opportunity to act strategically by taking just
enough care to foreclose litigation. Hylton, for instance, concludes that a
one-way fee-shifting rule operating in favor of plaintiffs would be best,
but this conclusion depends upon several features of his model (including,
perhaps most importantly, the assumption that plaintiff’s care does not
affect the expected cost of accidents). Applying such generalizations to
individual cases or categories of cases is probably beyond the capacity of
either courts or legislatures. As Gravelle concludes, ‘[i]t seems more
promising to pursue other, more direct means of correcting the inefficient
incentives for care provided by a costly and imperfect legal system’.
More recently, Choi and Sanchirico (2004) investigate the effects of
decoupling the amounts paid by losing defendants from the amounts
received by victorious plaintiffs when substantive behavior, filing
incentives, and the intensity of spending are all at issue. In their model,
the defendant first chooses a substantive action. The plaintiff next
decides whether to file suit. Finally, the parties choose their level of
effort at litigation. Choi and Sanchirico investigate the problem of
minimizing the social cost of a given level of deterrence by adjusting
three policy instruments: an upfront filing fee, the amount that victorious
plaintiffs recover, and the amount that losing defendants pay. Contrary to
earlier work by Polinsky and Che (1991), whose model does not include
litigation spending decisions, Choi and Sanchirico find that what
plaintiffs recover should be no lower than what defendants pay when the
conjunction of two conditions obtains: defendants are not wealthconstrained and the potential harm from defendants’ violations is
sufficiently great. Choi and Sanchirico show that their analysis is
invariant to whether the fee allocation rule is English or American.
Klement and Neeman (2005) investigate the effect of fee shifting rules
when the objective is to maximize the probability of settlement subject to
the constraint that a given amount of deterrence is generated by the threat
of litigation. Klement and Neeman model settlement negotiations, but
not litigation spending decisions. They find that maximizing the
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probability of settlement requires adopting the English rule. The English
rules creates the largest divergence between the trial payoffs of liable and
non liable defendants. It, therefore, allows the greatest amount of
deterrence per trial and so the fewest number of trials for a given amount
of deterrence.
7. Variations on Simple Fee Shifting
The foregoing discussion has been premised on the assumption that
‘costs follow the event’ - that is, that any fee shifting that takes place is
based solely on who wins the case. Much recent discussion in policy and
scholarly circles, however, has focused on two more complicated forms
of indemnification.
7.1 Fee Shifting Conditioned on Offers Made in Settlement Both England
and a number of American jurisdictions provide a mechanism through
which a defendant who would otherwise be obliged to pay for legal
expenses can partially avoid the obligation by making a suitable offer of
settlement. In England this procedure is called ‘payment into court’ and
requires the defendant to actually deposit funds with a court officer; while
in the United States, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 and similar rules 1
merely require the formal filing of what is labeled an ‘offer of judgment’.
Under either provision, a defendant who makes such a formal offer is
considered the prevailing party for purposes of cost allocation if the
plaintiff rejects the offer and then is subsequently awarded a lesser
amount at trial. In such an event, the defendant avoids having to pay any
costs incurred by the plaintiff subsequent to the offer, and is entitled to
indemnification for his own subsequent costs as well. By all accounts,
defendants avail themselves of this procedure much more frequently in
England than in the US - probably because the prospect of shifting
liability for ‘costs’ is likelier under the broader English definition of the
term to outweigh the disadvantages of making a settlement offer.
Similarly, within the US, Rule 68 appears to be used more widely in
disputes covered by one-way pro-plaintiff fee-shifting statutes such as
Title VII, since the Supreme Court held in Marek v. Chesny, that
attorney’s fees shifted under such statutes are to be considered ‘costs’
under Rule 68.
Because of the relatively infrequent use of Rule 68 in US courts, a
number of American critics have in recent years supported its expansion 1

Under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 7430, if a taxpayer makes an offer to the Internal
Revenue Service to settle a claim for taxes allegedly owed, and if the Internal Revenue Service
rejects the offer and later obtains a judgment against the taxpayer that is not greater than the
taxpayer’s offer, the taxpayer may be entitled to recover reasonable litigation costs, including
attorneys’ fees.
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either by extending its coverage to attorneys’ fees generally, or by
making the procedure available to plaintiffs as well as defendants. (It
should be noted, however, that providing the procedure to plaintiffs is
meaningless to the extent that they are already entitled to collect costs
when they prevail; in such circumstances, the opportunity to make an
offer of judgment can only advantage defendants.) The recent GOP
‘Contract with America’, for
example, would have established just such a generalized offer-ofjudgment rule in federal diversity cases. Such proposals have commonly
been supported by the claim that they will reduce expenditures on
litigation by encouraging parties to make more reasonable settlement
offers and to accept such offers when they are made. Their proponents
have also argued that it is fairer to charge the costs of trial to the party
who, by refusing a reasonable settlement, causes those costs to be
incurred.
In general, the economic literature on offers of judgment is substantially
less developed than that on pure indemnification, and many interesting
questions remain to be fully investigated, including the effect of the
procedure on strategic behavior in negotiations. The place to begin any
analysis of the offer of judgment, however, is with the observation that it
is essentially an option to convert disputes over damages into disputes
over liability. To see this, compare two cases: one in which it is clear that
the defendant has acted negligently but unclear whether the plaintiff’s
injuries are 1000 or 3000 (with the two possibilities being equally likely),
and a second in which it is clear that damages are 4000, but an even
gamble whether the defendant is liable at all. In both cases, expected
damages are 2000, but absent an offer-of-judgment procedure the
plaintiff’s position is stronger in the former. She is certain to prevail at
trial and to recover some fraction of her costs, even if it is only court fees.
In the latter case, she runs the risk of paying both her costs and a portion
of the defendant’s. Under Rule 68 or a similar procedure, however, the
defendant can convert the former dispute into a partial settlement of 1000
combined with a dispute over whether the defendant is liable for an
additional 2000. In this converted dispute, the defendant stands an even
chance of avoiding liability for the plaintiff’s costs and of recovering his
own. This improves his expected position to what it would be in the case
of pure liability, at the plaintiff’s expense.
The example illustrates two lessons. First, a rule authorizing defendants
but not plaintiffs to make offers of judgment redistributes wealth from
plaintiffs to defendants in disputes that are entirely or partly over
damages, as both Priest (1982) and Miller (1986) have suggested. Second,
such offers have no effect in disputes that are purely over liability. If the
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only possible trial outcomes are verdicts of zero or 4000, for instance,
there is no advantage to the defendant in making a Rule 68 offer of less
than the full 4000. If he offers a lesser amount, he will be liable for costs
in the event of a plaintiff’s verdict and certain to receive costs in the event
of a defendant’s verdict - just as he would if he made no offer at all.
Similarly, a less-than-full offer does not affect the possible payoffs for the
plaintiff. The defendant could of course offer to settle for the full 4000,
but the plaintiff should be happy to accept such an offer whether or not
Rule 68 is in force.
The offer-of-judgment procedure, accordingly, cannot affect whether an
offer is made or accepted in such cases.
With these points taken as caveats, the effects of offer-of-judgment rules
are roughly analogous to those of indemnification in general. The
possibility that costs will be shifted following a settlement offer both
raises the stakes of the case and lowers the perceived marginal cost of
legal expenditure, thus increasing incentives to expend resources at trial.
The effect is less than under the pure English rule, however, since only
post-offer expenditures are liable to be shifted. Similarly, the opportunity
to make an offer of judgment increases expected payoffs for plaintiffs
who expect to win large awards at trial, and lowers expected payouts of
defendants who expect awards to be low, emboldening such parties to
pursue litigation.
The effect of offers of judgment on the settlement decision depends, like
the effect of indemnification generally, on the parties’ attitudes toward
risk and on the model of settlement that one thinks appropriate. Under the
Landes-Posner-Gould optimism model, offers of judgment tend to lower
the chances of settlement between risk-neutral parties, since, as Priest
(1982) suggests and Miller (1986) and Chung (1996) confirm, such offers
lower the reservation values of optimistic defendants more than they do
those of optimistic plaintiffs, thus reducing the potential settlement range.
Offers of judgment also increase the risk of litigation, though not as much
as pure indemnification does; this encourages risk-averse parties to settle,
but risk-preferring parties to litigate. Anderson (1994), who extends the
optimism model to include the possibility of bargaining stalemate,
reaches similar results. Within Bayesian models of settlement, the
outcome appears more complicated. Cooter, Marks and Mnookin (1982)
conjecture that an offer-of-judgment rule, by effectively taxing hard
offers and subsidizing soft ones, should encourage settlement. Spier
(1994), however, in a model in which defendants make offers to plaintiffs
with private information, finds that the procedure leads to more
settlement than the pure American rule in cases where the plaintiff’s
private information relates solely to the size of the award, less settlement
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than the American rule in cases where the plaintiff’s private information
relates solely to the probability of liability, and an ambiguous effect in
other cases. She also demonstrates a similar result using a mechanismdesign model that, instead of specifying any particular bargaining
process, assumes that the parties use a Pareto-efficient trading mechanism
in the style of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). As with pure
indemnification, accordingly, the effect of offers of judgment on
settlement probabilities appears to depend on the sources of the
underlying dispute.
7.2 Fee Shifting Conditioned on the Margin of Victory
In the United States, a variety of statutory and judicially created rules
allow courts to award partial or full indemnification in lawsuits in which
the losing party’s case is deemed after the fact to be of sufficiently low
merit. Such rules include the common-law torts of barratry, abuse of
process, and malicious prosecution, the traditional authority of courts of
equity to exercise their discretion in the interests of justice, the sanctions
for discovery abuse provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, and
the (just amended) provisions of the Internal Revenue Code requiring the
government to pay a taxpayer’s reasonable litigation costs upon a court
finding that the government’s position in a tax dispute was substantially
unjustified. Similarly, as Pfennigstorf (1984) reports, indemnification
awards in most other Western legal systems are likely to be more
generous in cases where the loser’s legal or factual position appears
weak.
The possibility of tying indemnification to the merits of the losing case
has attracted increased attention in recent years, in part as a response to
the growth of litigation practice under US Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11. This rule requires persons filing court papers to warrant
that their filings are well grounded, and authorizes courts to impose
monetary sanctions on parties whose filings are found to be frivolous,
harassing, or made for purposes of delay. Limiting fee shifting to cases of
particularly low merit has seemed to many commentators an attractive
compromise between the English and American rules, since it protects
clearly deserving litigants without imposing unnecessary risk on those
who bring colorable claims in good faith.
As Bebchuk and Chang (1996) have pointed out, the effect of policies
such as Rule 11 is to condition fee shifting on the winner’s margin of
victory; those who win in a rout receive indemnification, while those who
win narrowly do not. They confirm the conventional wisdom in a formal
model, showing that such policies, if designed properly, can do a better
job than either the English or the American rule at encouraging
meritorious suits (and by analogy, defenses) and discouraging frivolous
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ones. The reason is that such policies make use of the parties’ private ex
ante information regarding the merits of the case. A party who loses by a
large margin is less likely to have believed ex ante that her case had
merit; conversely, one who wins by a large margin is less likely to have
believed that her case lacked merit. While the optimal fee shifting rule
depends on the distribution of judicial and litigant error, it is possible by
altering the threshold for fee shifting to regulate the proportion of
potential claims and defenses that are actually brought into the system.
Because its effects are zero-sum, however, margin-based fee shifting is
still less efficient than policies that decouple one side’s payments from
the other side’s recovery (see generally Polinsky and Rubinfeld, 1993).
Policies that tax or subsidize individual parties based on the ex post
quality of their case may be best of all; they may also, of course, be the
most difficult to administer.
While other incentive effects of margin-based fee shifting have not been
formally explored, it appears likely that it has analogous consequences to
indemnification generally, though in lesser degree. These consequences
recapitulate the discussion in earlier sections of this article and can be
surveyed in brief. First, to the extent that such policies succeed in
encouraging meritorious claims and defenses and discouraging frivolous
ones, they will tend to improve incentives for primary substantive
behavior. The complications described in Section 6 above, however,
remain to be analyzed. It is possible, for instance, that the prospect of
shifting litigation costs to the other side following a commanding victory
will induce excessive caretaking ex ante, though the benefits of doing so
are less than under the pure English rule.
Second, margin-based fee shifting will both raise the stakes of litigation
and decrease its expected marginal cost, inducing the parties to intensify
their efforts at trial. Schmalbeck and Myers (1986) argue that this effect
will be relatively minor, since in a truly frivolous case there is little that
the parties can do to change the outcome. Their argument is open to
question, however, as the substantial amount of litigation effort under
Rule 11 illustrates (see, for example, Kobayashi and Parker, 1993, who
discuss the incentive effects of recent amendments intended to reduce
such ‘satellite’ litigation). While margin-based indemnification has little
effect on cases that are clearly contestable or clearly frivolous, in many
disputes the colorability of the losing case is less obvious. Parties in such
intermediate cases, thus, will have an incentive to increase their
expenditures in order to influence the size of the margin of victory.
Third, margin-based fee shifting will decrease the likelihood of settlement
to the extent that the parties have a difference of opinion regarding the
chances of indemnification. Optimistic parties will exaggerate the
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likelihood that they will win by a large margin and underestimate the
likelihood that they will lose by a large margin. The prospect of
indemnification will cause such parties to toughen their settlement
demands, reducing the range for settlement. Since pessimistic and
unbiased parties will have an incentive to settle in any event, the net
consequence will be an increase in trials. Similarly, given private
information regarding the probability of a one-sided outcome, marginbased fee shifting will increase the variance of the parties’ reservation
settlement values, encouraging tougher bargaining and hence fewer
settlements. The increased risk of trial, however, works to counteract such
effects for risk-averse litigants.
In sum, however, the case for at least some margin-based fee shifting
appears stronger than the case for indemnification generally, on grounds
of both fairness and efficiency. Parties who lose lawsuits decisively are
probably more deserving of sanction than those who lose barely. The
social value of litigation is probably higher in close cases, whether
measured by the public benefits of legal precedent or by more libertarian
considerations. And margin-based fee shifting seems to do a better job at
providing improved incentives for primary behavior, and has lower costs
in terms of incentives for increased expenditure at trial. In light of the
relatively limited theoretical and empirical work on this particular topic,
however, these conclusions must be regarded as tentative.
8. Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Fee Shifting
Given the complexity and ambiguity of the aforementioned
considerations, it would plainly be desirable to have some hard empirical
evidence to bring to the policy debate. Unfortunately, such evidence is
sparse. What evidence exists on the effects of fee shifting falls into three
categories: laboratory research on bargaining behavior by experimental
subjects, numerical simulations of litigation behavior based on
empirically obtained parameters, and econometric evidence primarily
drawn from a single policy experiment: Florida’s experience with the
English rule in medical malpractice cases from 1980 through 1985.
8.1 Laboratory Experiments
Coursey and Stanley (1988) tested the effects of fee shifting within an
experimental setting they designed to simulate the process of bargaining
under threat of trial. They divided their subjects (students at the
University of Wyoming) into pairs and instructed them to attempt to
divide between themselves a number of tokens that were subsequently
convertible into cash. If time expired before the subjects reached
agreement, the tokens were divided through a random drawing, intended
to represent an uncertain court award. To simulate rational expectations,
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the subjects were presented with the probability distribution of awards
arising from the random drawing, and to simulate the costs of trial, the
subjects were collectively fined an amount equaling 40 percent of the
total value of the tokens in the event the drawing had to take place.
The experimenters conducted negotiations using three different cost
allocation rules. Under the simplest procedure, the fine was divided
between the two parties equally, in an intended simulation of the
American rule. A second group of subjects negotiated under a rule
whereby the fine was paid entirely by the party who received the smaller
portion of the token in a random drawing; this was intended to simulate
the English rule. Yet a third group negotiated under an offer-of-judgment
rule intended to simulate Rule 68: the plaintiff paid the entire fine if the
draw awarded her an amount less than or equal to the defendant’s last
proposal; and the fine was otherwise split equally.
The result of this experiment was that subjects settled more frequently
under the English than under the American rule. Under Rule 68
settlement was likeliest of all; and in addition the plaintiff was much
more likely to be the accepting party. The authors also found that
settlements were more favorable to the defendant under Rule 68 than
under the English rule, consistent with the theoretical predictions outlined
in the previous section. The American rule was most favorable of all for
the defendant, though the authors ascribed this result to the behavior of
one especially risk-averse individual. These findings are consistent with
theoretical models that predict increased settlement on the basis of simple
risk aversion. Because the experimental design ruled out the possibility of
optimism or private information, however, its results cannot be
extrapolated to situations in which such phenomena, which could cause
the English rule to reduce settlement, are present.
In a separate series of survey experiments, Rowe and various co-authors
studied the effects of cost allocation rules on lawyers’ and students’
responses to a variety of bargaining situations presented by hypothetical
tort and civil rights cases. While this experimental design suffered from
the weakness that the subjects were not provided with any direct financial
incentives, the more realistic nature of the problems and the subjects’
professional status and experience provided at least some motivation to
bargain seriously. The results of the experiments, however, were mixed.
Rowe and Vidmar (1988) found that there was little difference between
the American rule and a modified Rule 68 (enhanced to cover attorneys’
fees and to allow plaintiffs as well as defendants to make offers) on law
students’ willingness to accept offers of settlement, although they did find
an effect on the size of counteroffers as well as a difference in plaintiff
acceptance rates between modified Rule 68 and a one-way pro-plaintiff
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rule. Anderson and Rowe (1996) replicated this experiment with
practicing lawyers, also examining the subjects’ behavior under an
alternative fee shifting rule in which the maker of a rejected offer had to
pay the rejecting party’s subsequent reasonable attorneys’ fees. They
found that while modified Rule 68 did not appreciably affect plaintiffs’
minimum asks relative to the American rule, it did raise the maximum
amounts that defendants were willing to offer. Finally, Rowe and
Anderson (1996) considered the effects of a modified Rule 68 on
hypothetical bargaining in civil rights cases otherwise governed by a proplaintiff rule. They found that replacing this one-way rule with an
enhanced Rule 68 significantly lowered plaintiffs’ minimum asks, as well
as the gap between plaintiff asks and defendant offers. In all, these results
suggest that fee shifting has its strongest effect when it is one-sided and
when the favored side is risk averse or liquidity constrained.
More recently, Main and Park (2000) find that shifting between the
English and American rules has no effect on the frequency of pre-trial
settlements, but that the English rule leads to greater settlement amounts
when the probability of the plaintiff prevailing is relatively large. Their
experimental data is derived from repeatedly and randomly pairing 14
undergraduate students to play a five-minute negotiating game in which
bids were transmitted back and forth by intermediaries. The subjects
were modestly compensated. Each pairing of undergraduates played
several times under different rules, and one play was selected at random
for purposes of determining payoffs. This experimental design allowed
repeated play and learning without creating wealth effects. (However, it
also diminished the impact of the monetary reward on each play.)
Main and Park (2002) present experimental data on the effect of a
defendant-offer-of-judgment rule when such a rule is applied against the
backdrop of the English rule for costs. Thus, in those circumstances in
which the offer-of-judgment rule does not operate—as when the
defendant does not make an offer or the plaintiff wins more than the
offer—the losing side pays all costs. Main and Park find that an offer-ofjudgment rule has no effect on the frequency of settlement but lowers the
settlement amount. The experimental design in Main and Park (2002) is
similar to that in Main and Park (2000). Thirty eight university students
were repeatedly and randomly paired. The researchers modestly
compensated their subjects based on the rule-affected outcome of a threeminute computer-interactive negotiation game. Each pairing of subjects
played several times under different rules, and one play was selected at
random for purposes of determining payoffs.
8.2 Simulations A number of authors have attempted to estimate the
quantitative effects of fee shifting by numerically simulating the behavior
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of theoretical models. Katz’s (1987) approach is illustrative. He
developed algebraic formulas, based on a linear approximation to the
standard model of litigation expenditure, that relate the difference in
expenditure per case between the English and American rules to two
empirical parameters: the ratio of total expenditure to the stakes of the
case, and the elasticity with which parties increase their expenditures in
response to higher stakes. Using empirical estimates of these parameters
taken from the University of Wisconsin’s Civil Litigation Research
Project (Trubek et al. 1983), he calculated the likely effects of switching
from the American to the English rule, concluding that such a switch
would increase expenditures per case in the neighborhood of 125 percent.
Such a large increase in cost per case, however, could be expected to lead
to a reduction in the number of cases or to increased settlement. In an
attempt to measure this anticipated reduction, Hause (1989) extended the
Landes-Gould optimism model to allow for variable expenditure, and
calculated its numerical behavior for a range of possible parameter
values. He concluded that the increased costs per case under the English
rule were sufficient to outweigh any effects of optimism, resulting on
balance in an increased frequency of settlement. Hersch (1990)
recalculated Hause’s simulations under the assumption that trial
expenditure is determined in a conjectural-variations rather than a Nash
equilibrium. He found that both settlement and costs per case rose, though
by a lesser amount than Hause had estimated. The parameter values
Hause and Hersch used, however, were not based on any empirical data.
Donohue (1991a) recalculated Hause’s simulations using what he argued
were more plausible parameter estimates, and concluded that the English
rule would increase trials on balance.
Hylton (1993a, 1993b) used numerical simulation to estimate the effects
of fee shifting on primary behavior. He concludes that while litigation is
more frequent under the English than the American rule, levels of
substantive compliance under the two rules would be similar. Best of all,
according to his calculations, is one-way pro-plaintiff fee shifting, which
leads to the highest level of compliance and least amount of litigation.
These conclusions, however, depend both on the functional form used in
his simulations, and on the specific assumptions of his theoretical model.
Watanabe (2006), which is described below, combines simulation
techniques with econometric estimation in order to study the effects of
litigation reform on settlement timing.
8.3 Econometric Evidence of Actual Disputes
Schwab and Eisenberg (1988) report on a 1976 statute that established
one-way pro-plaintiff fee shifting in federal constitutional tort cases (that
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is, cases in which the federal government is sued for violating the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights). They find some evidence that the statute
was followed by a decline in plaintiff success rates at trial and by an
increase in trials relative to other federal civil actions, but little evidence
of any increase in the number of lawsuits filed. These results suggest that
the statute had its primary effect in encouraging plaintiffs to bargain more
aggressively in settlement negotiations, consistent with Rowe et al.’s
survey experiments as well as with the theoretical predictions of the
optimism and Bayesian settlement models discussed in Section 5 above.
Because of the relatively low magnitude of their quantitative estimates,
however, and because their observations were muddied by the fact that
some courts shifted fees on a discretionary basis before the statute was
passed, the authors present their findings as tentative.
Fournier and Zuehlke (1989) develop an econometric model of settlement
behavior in which the plaintiff’s settlement demand and the probability of
settlement are jointly determined. Using nonlinear methods that correct
for data censoring (that is, the fact that the amount of the demand is only
observed when settlement takes place), they estimate their model using
data from a nationwide survey of civil federal filings between 1979 and
1981. The data classifies disputes according to the type of legal claim at
issue (for example, tort, copyright, antitrust) and includes information
regarding the alleged damages and the number of litigants in each case,
the mean and variance of trial awards in litigated cases within each
subject-matter classification, and separately prepared estimates of
government litigation costs in each case classification, which the authors
argue serve as a reasonable proxy for private litigation costs. The
coefficients of the resulting equations suggest, not surprisingly, that
settlement demands are positively correlated with mean trial awards and
alleged damages, and negatively correlated with litigation costs. More
interestingly, they also suggest that settlement is more likely in cases and
categories with high alleged damages, high mean and variance of trial
awards, multiple parties, and low (!) litigation costs. These latter results
are at odds with the theoretical predictions of most models of settlement,
although the negative relationship between settlement and potential trial
awards is consistent with a hypothesis of risk aversion.
Because a fraction of the sampled filings were subject to the English rule,
Fournier and Zuehlke were able to estimate its effects as well. They find
that fee shifting is negatively correlated with both the probability of
settlement and the size of the settlement demand, although the latter
effect is not statistically significant. This finding lends some support to
the predictions of both the optimism and Bayesian models. The filings in
their sample governed by the English rule, however, were few in number
and concentrated in a few specialized areas, so this evidence cannot be
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regarded as especially strong. It is possible that this correlation reflects
differences in the types of disputes covered by the rule, rather than effects
of indemnification. The authors’ unusual findings regarding the other
determinants of settlement also call this result into question.
More instructive is Hughes’ and Snyder’s research on Florida’s
experiment with the English rule in medical malpractice cases. The
Florida statute, passed in 1980 with the support of the state medical
association, also provided an offer-of-judgment procedure and exempted
insolvent parties from the obligation to pay indemnification; it was
repealed in 1985 with the support of its original proponents following a
series of expensive and well-publicized plaintiff verdicts. In Snyder and
Hughes (1990), the authors use a bivariate probit procedure to analyze
insurance company data on closed claims filed before, during, and after
the period in which the rule was in effect, and estimate the effects of
indemnification on plaintiffs’ decisions to drop claims, settlement, and
defendants’ expenditure on lawyers. Their findings lend support to
several of the theoretical predictions outlined in previous sections of this
article. Specifically, they find that in cases governed by the English rule,
(1) a significantly higher percentage of claims were dropped at an early
stage of the litigation, consistent with the proposition that fee shifting
encourages risk-averse and low probability plaintiffs to exit the system;
(2) defendants spent significantly more per case, in amounts consistent
with Katz’s simulations, in both settled and in litigated cases; (3) holding
other case characteristics constant, the likelihood of litigation increased,
consistent with the optimism model. Because dropped cases tended
disproportionately to have characteristics that would have made them
likelier to go to trial had they remained in the system, however, the
authors conclude that the English rule decreased the frequency of
litigation on balance. Because of greater expenditure per case, however,
total expenditures on litigation still increased.
In a subsequent article analyzing the same data set (Hughes and Snyder,
1995), the authors find that the English rule was associated with an
increased frequency of plaintiff success rates at trial, increased jury
awards, and larger out-of-court settlements. These increases were
significant not just statistically but in absolute terms; for instance, the
average judgment in litigated cases increased from $25,190 in cases
governed by the American rule to $69,390 in cases governed by the
English rule. These results appear to be driven by the case selection
effects detailed in the first article. The authors suggest that their results
vindicate the proposition that indemnification improves the quality of
claims brought, although they admit the possibility of an alternative
explanation that low-damage cases are merely being driven away by the
higher costs of litigation. They conclude that fee shifting, contrary to the
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assertions of some legal practitioners, is not necessarily an antiplaintiff
policy. Rather, it benefits plaintiffs with high-quality or high-damage
claims at the expense of those with low-quality or low-damage claims,
and possibly at the expense of defendants. These conclusions, if valid,
would explain why the financial advantages expected by the Florida
statute’s original proponents did not appear to materialize; they would
also suggest that the statute improved the deterrent effect of civil liability.
Whether such an improvement would be worth the increased litigation
expenditures it occasioned, however, and whether it would be replicated
in other areas of law with different substantive and procedural
characteristics from medical malpractice, remain open questions.
Two recent empirical studies emphasize the impact of cost shifting rules
on the dynamics of litigation, and in particular, the timing of settlement.
Watanabe (2006) also analyzes Florida data, but from a time period
following repeal of that state’s experiment with the English rule.
Watanabe studies the effect of the English rule on the timing of
settlement and the costs of delayed resolution. He finds that the English
rule results in longer and costlier disputes because, with more at stake,
parties have a greater incentive to wait longer for new information
regarding the merits of the plainitff’s case before making the decision to
settle.
Watanabe uses a methodology that combines econometric estimation and
numerical simulation. His analysis proceeds in three steps.
First, he constructs a theoretical model of settlement dynamics. Potential
litigants meet to discuss settlement after injury has been suffered, but
before a suit has been filed. During this prefiling phase of settlement
negotiations, the plaintiff may file suit, thus causing bargaining to enter a
second, litigation phase. The pre-litigation phase is time-bound by the
statute of limitations; the litigation phase is time-bound by the scheduled
court date. The parties begin negotiations with different beliefs about the
plaintiff’s chance of prevailing at trial. They identically discount future
costs and benefits, and they agree, and are certain regarding, what the
plaintiff would recover should she prevail at trial. In each period of each
phase of negotiation: 1) new information may arrive upon which the
parties update their beliefs regarding the plaintiff’s chance of winning at
trial, 2) one (randomly selected) party makes a settlement offer, 3) the
other decides whether or not to accept the offer, and 4) in the prelitigation phase, the plaintiff decides whether or not to accelerate the
process by filing suit. Plaintiffs have contingent fee arrangements with
their attorneys under which the attornies pay all costs. Thus, Watanabe’s
model is a kind of sequential bargaining model with non common priors
and exogenous learning.
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Second, Watanabe estimates his model. To do so, Watanabe uses a data
set on medical malpractice insurance claims in Florida for serious injuries
or death that were closed between 1985 and 1999. The data set contains
detailed information on the time, mode, cost, and terms of settlement, the
occurrence and time of filing, and litigant characteristics. Using
numerical methods (combined with functional form assumptions),
Watanable determines the conditional probability distribution of
observable variables that would result from each possible array of
unobserved parameter values. He then estimates such unobserved
parameter values by choosing the array of such values that assigns the
maximum likelihood to the configuration of observable variables that are
actually observed in the data.
Thirdly, Watanabe conducts policy experiments on his so-calibrated
model. Of particular relevance to the topic at hand, Watanabe finds that
moving to a loser-pays-all allocation of legal fees would delay settlement
and increase legal costs. Under the rule modification that Watanabe
studies, the plaintiff herself, as opposed to her attorney, pays defendant’s
legal costs if the plaintiff loses. For each party, the English rule causes a
greater divergence in each party’s payoffs as between prevailing and
losing. Watanabe describes the intuition for additional delay this way:
[The] trade-off between [the] potential for learning new information and
[the] extra legal cost due to delay determines the equilibrium of the model.
[T]he value of learning increases with loser-pay-all legal fee allocation
because [the] difference in payoff from winning and losing judgement is
increased. Hence, settlement timing delays and legal costs increase.

Yoon and Baker (2006) obtain quite different results. They use insurance
data on the disposition (including settlement) of filed cases in New Jersey
to study the effect of New Jersey’s expansion of its bilateral offer-ofjudgment rule to allow the categorical recovery of unlimited attorney’s
fees. (The unilateral federal rule allows recovery of attorney’s fees only
in certain situations.)
Yoon and Baker obtained their data from an insurance company (whose
name they are unable to disclose). The cases in Yoon and Baker’s sample
consist of suits by non-policyholders against the insurance company for
injuries allegedly caused by policyholders. Most suits in the database
arise from automobile and homeowners insurance policies.
Yoon and Baker employ a “difference-in-differences” approach. Their
treatment group consists of New Jersey litigants involved in suits before
and after the offer-of-judgment rule was strengthened. Their control
group consists of similarly-situated litigants in surrounding states that did
not experience a similar rule change. Yoon and Baker examine whether
differences in relevant variables across the two times periods differ across
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their treatment and control groups. Importantly, Yoon and Baker argue
that the New Jersey rule change that they study—because it was judicial
and not legislative—was likely exogenous and not itself a reflection of
underlying, unobservable differences between the treatment and control
groups.
Yoon and Baker find that the New Jersey rule change reduced time to
resolution by roughly 7 percent and reduced the insurance company’s
attorney’s fees by roughly 20 percent. They conclude that “a substantial
cost-shifting mechanism would be an effective means of increasing the
efficacy of offer-of-judgment rules.”
Yoon and Baker hypothesize that their results are driven mainly by the
effect of the rule change on settlement timing. They suggest that
expanding the range of shiftable costs under the bilateral offer of
judgement rule caused parties to reach settlement more quickly (though
not more often, according to their data), and that this reduction in the
duration of litigation, in turn, was the dominant force acting on attorney’s
fees. Why did the rule change reduce time to settlement? Yoon and
Baker postulate that, among many conflicting forces, the dominant effects
of expanded cost shifting were these: 1) parties were induced to make
more generous settlement offers, and 2) parties regarded trial as a less
favorable prospect because the increased stakes implied a harmful
escalation in spending.
In contrast, Watanabe (2006), discussed above, finds that moving to a
loser-pays-all allocation of legal fees delays settlement and thereby
increases legal costs. Several factors might explain the difference in the
implications for settlement timing as between Watanabe (2006) and Yoon
and Baker (2006). One possible factor, of course, is that the rule changes
considered in each study are not identical: the expanded cost shifting in
Yoon and Baker, but not in Watanabe, is conditional on the proposal and
rejection of a settlement offer. However, it is unclear from existing
theory what impact this difference might have on settlement timing.
Another possible factor concerns differences in case composition. While
Watanable looks at medical malpractice cases, Yoon and Baker consider
cases arising from automobile accidents and property damage. In
Watanabe (2006) cases take longer to settle with a cost shifting rule
because, the stakes of the case being greater, parties are willing to wait
longer for new information revealed in pre trial process. It is possible
that this wait-to-learn dynamic is more pronounced in medical
malpractice cases than in auto accident and property damage cases.
Plausibly, the information flow in medical malpractice cases is both more
substantial and more extenuated—given the more prominent role of
scientific and medical expertise.
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9. Conclusion
All in all, despite the substantial scholarly and popular attention that the
question of indemnity for legal fees has attracted, the number of robust
conclusions that can be drawn regarding its consequences are few. Fee
shifting does appear to increase legal expenditures per case, in some cases
significantly. It also encourages parties with poorly grounded legal claims
to settle or to avoid litigating them in the first place, and has a similar
effect on litigants who are averse to risk, regardless of the merits of their
cases. Aside from these generalizations, most of the other propositions
commonly asserted about fee shifting can neither be verified nor rejected.
It is unclear whether fee shifting increases the likelihood of settlement,
whether it decreases total expenditures on litigation or total payouts by
defendants, or whether it on balance improves incentives for primary
behavior. It is even unclear whether fee shifting makes it easier for parties
with small meritorious claims to obtain compensation, in light of the
increased costs per case that it induces. In this regard, the relative lack of
systematic empirical investigation of these questions is particularly
lamentable.
In light of this state of affairs, one is tempted to conclude that the amount
of scholarly attention directed to this topic exceeds its actual social
importance. The continued popular and political interest in fee-shifting
rules, however, makes this conclusion problematic. While some support
for fee shifting arises from its relative simplicity and its status as the
international majority rule, much of its continued appeal undoubtedly
stems from its association with deeply held notions of corrective justice and specifically, from the idea that a party who is determined ex post to
be in the right should be made financially whole. Counterarguments
based on economic efficiency, or indeed on any ex ante perspective, can
never entirely rebut this simple yet powerful intuition.
Whether the English rule is more just than the American rule, or whether
its greater fairness justifies its incentive properties, cannot be settled by
lawyers or economists alone. The citizenry as a whole must decide
whether the principle of full compensation for victorious litigants
outweighs the procedural values of providing citizens with an open forum
for grievances and an opportunity to be heard, the uncertainty imposed on
those who cannot predict the outcome of court decisions, and the political
implications of regulating legal fees through a system of bureaucratic
oversight rather than through private contract between attorney and client.
Moreover, as Prichard (1988) and Hylton (1996) have observed, rules of
cost allocation feed back through the selection of cases to influence the
development of other areas of substantive and procedural law. Rules that
encourage parties to raise relatively innovative claims and defenses help
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to break down precedent, while rules that penalize risk-taking and novel
arguments help to preserve traditional formal categories. Given the
pervasive influence of ostensibly procedural rules on substantive
outcomes, it may not be possible to separate the policy of fee shifting
from deeper questions of what the law should be.
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